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The roles and missions of militaries around the world are expanding into new 
areas. This, inevitably, affects the existing concepts of civil–military relations, and forces 
us to rethink those concepts in light of new roles and missions for the military. These 
issues are pertinent particularly to recently democratized countries such as Turkey. Since 
its path to democratization in 1946, Turkey has endeavored to develop democratic civil–
military relations. Starting in the 1980s, Turkey’s civil–military relations have been 
particularly influenced by an internal security threat—the Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan (PKK). The Turkish governments have utilized a concerted action of the police 
and gendarmerie forces, affiliated under the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) against this terrorist organization, with the Turkish Armed Forces as the 
leading actor. This thesis assesses the effects of the non-traditional roles and missions 
assigned to the TAF within this context on democratic civilian control. Even though there 
have been minor changes at the institutional level, the TAF’s intense involvement in the 
fight against the PKK has created a cultural shift from confrontation to cooperation 
between the civilians and the soldiers, and thus has increased the level of cooperation. 
This harmony has provided the actors with an opportunity to lay firm foundations for 
democratic civilian control without provoking the TAF, and increased military 
effectiveness without creating a sense of threat over civilians still being haunted by 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The current security context is dynamic, complex, and unpredictable, dominated 
more by non-state, network-like, actors, versus traditional states’ acts. In 2015 alone, 416 
terrorist attacks happened in Turkey, claiming the lives of 488 and leaving 1099 people 
injured.1 All of this calls for network-like government action and response, and reveals 
that one agency (or even one country) is virtually unable to face these threats alone. The 
roles and missions of militaries around the world are expanding into new areas, such as 
countering terrorism and organized crime, fighting gangs, and supporting natural 
disasters. This, inevitably, affects the traditional concepts of civil–military relations, 
which attribute one role to the armed forces—fight and win external wars—and forces us 
to re-think those concepts in the light of new roles and missions for the military. These 
issues are pertinent to both established and developing democracies, including Turkey. 
The evolution of the field of civil–military relations (CMR), which defines the 
relationship between the soldiers holding the authority to use power in the name of the 
nation and the civilians designating and checking the limits of this authority, dates back 
to the 19th century, when standing professional militaries emerged, and a division 
between the roles of military leaders and state officials (civilians) occurred.2 This 
relationship turned into a problematic power struggle in a comparatively short time, for 
the following two reasons: first, “fear of the threat a large standing army poses,” and 
hence the “need to keep it subordinate-that is, under civilian control,”3 and second, the 
idea that security and liberty were competing demands.4 As Rifat Ucarol argues, the first 
                                                 




2 Salih Akyurek et al., Sivil-Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi (Civil-Military Relations and 
Civil-Military Gap) (Ankara: Bilgesam Yayinlari, 2014), 1. 
3 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 911. 
4 Ibid. 
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reason can be observed in the dispatching of Napoleon Bonaparte to an expedition on 
Egypt by the Directoire in 1798, partly in an effort to keep an illustrious general away 
from mainland France and thus reduce the threat from soldiers under his command.5  
Clausewitz offered a solution to this problematique, by defining the war as “a 
mere continuation of policy by other means.”6 He argued that “political view is the 
object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our 
conception,”7 and thus advocated for the supremacy of the politicians over soldiers-that is 
civilian control of the military. This civil–military relations concept has been developed 
and improved over time by many scholars and thinkers, including Samuel Huntington, 
Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer. The civilian control concept has been utilized by 
many countries ever since. The countries have adapted and applied the concept of civilian 
control of the armed forces, based on their specific geo-strategical locations, intrinsic 
threat perceptions, domestic and international security developments, as well as with their 
level of democratic consolidation.  
Matei argues that the focus on civilian control of civil–military relations concept 
was “concerned primarily with the armed forces, … military intrusions in domestic 
politics thorough coups d’état, [and] … with asserting civilian control of the military”8 
and adds that “it is not sufficient to describe civil–military relations in the twenty-first 
century in terms of control alone.”9 Having realized this insufficiency, scholars such as 
Thomas C. Bruneau, Douglas Porch, Paul Shemella, and Cristiana Matei have identified a 
second dimension, more appropriate for the conceptualization of the Civil–Military 
Relations in the current security context: effectiveness of security forces (military, police, 
intelligence) in fulfilling the roles and missions assigned by the civilian decision makers. 
                                                 
5 Rifat Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih (Political History): 1789–2014 (Istanbul: DER Yayinlari (DER 
Publications), 2015), 92. 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Project Gutenberg, 2006), 100. 
7 Ibid., 101. 
8 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Reations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 26. 
9 Ibid. 
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Such roles include fighting internal wars, combating terrorism, and fighting crime, which 
depart from the traditional defense role.10  
Basically, these scholars do not rule out the necessity of civilian control; instead, 
they argue that “civilian control is basic and fundamental, but it is irrelevant unless the 
instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfill their roles and missions.” There 
are two important elements of this concept. First, national security is no longer the sole 
focus of the armed forces’ roles and missions and because of the overall complexity of 
security context “military forces (focused primarily on external threats), police forces 
(focused primarily on domestic threats), and intelligence agencies (focused on both) are 
increasingly compelled to support each other, share roles, and cooperate, sometimes at 
the international level.”11 Second is the redefinition of roles and missions in accord with 
the increasing “network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats and 
challenges … [and] the blurring of boundaries between domestic and external security 
threats.”12  
Within this context, Matei introduces six roles and delineates the agencies’ 
(military, police, and intelligence) partaking in the implementation of these roles: (1) 
wars (armed forces, military intelligence), (2) internal wars (special forces, police, 
intelligence), (3) terrorism (intelligence, police, armed forces, special forces), (4) crime 
(police, police intelligence, back-up support from the military), (5) humanitarian 
assistance (military, police, back-up support from intelligence), and (6) peace operations 
(military, police, intelligence).13 Defense Diplomacy, which is defined as “the nonviolent 
use of military forces … to further a country’s international agenda”14 was suggested by 
Capt. Stifani Micky Rori as an emerging role for the militaries.  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 31. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 31. 
14 Gregory Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy,” IWM, May 15, 2014, 
http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiii/the-velvet-gauntlet/. 
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Since its path to democratization in 1946, Turkey has endeavored to develop 
democratic civil–military relations.15 Turkey’s civil–military relations have been 
particularly influenced by an internal security threat—the existence of Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan (PKK). The PKK, was officially founded on November 27, 1978, as a political 
party with a goal of promoting the idea of an independent Kurdish state and later on “to 
establish a left-wing Kurdish state which would serve as a platform for the dissemination 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the creation of a series of allied Marxist-Leninist states, 
throughout the Middle East.”16 The PKK is considered a terrorist organization by many 
countries, including the United States.17  
The Turkish government has utilized a concerted action—of the police and 
gendarmerie forces, affiliated under the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF), against this terrorist organization—with the Turkish Armed Forces as 
leading actor. A critical question could be raised in this context: How has the 
democratization of civil–military relations in Turkey (conceptualized by democratic 
civilian control and effectiveness of the military) been affected since the assignment of 
the TAF with non-traditional roles, such as domestic, counter terrorism duties? Has the 
involvement of the TAF in domestic security affected, negatively, positively, or both, the 
democratic civilian control of the military in Turkey? Has this non-traditional role of the 
TAF had any impact (positive, negative, or both) on the effectiveness of the TAF?  
 
 
                                                 
15 In 1946, Turkey adopted the multi-party system, which, eventually, transformed Turkey into an 
electoral democracy. 




17 Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State. The Office of website Management, “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,” Other Release, U.S. Department of State, (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
5 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
As David Pion Berlin argues in his foreword to Who Guards the Guardians and 
How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations; to survive in today’s world, democracies 
need to accomplish a sustainable balance between the control of the armed forces by 
civilians and the effectiveness of the very same armed forces.18 Although the methods to 
accomplish this sustainable and “proper balance between democratic civilian leadership 
and military effectiveness in achieving roles and missions”19 vary from country to 
country and region to region, politicians in a majority of the countries have 
predominantly been concerned about keeping the armed forces under control—through 
limits on the mission, size, and budget—or at least keeping them out of the “political 
sphere.”20 The common rationale used to justify this policy has been that “any armed 
force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take it over.”21 Thomas-
Durrel Young gives an example to this:
Britain, because of its long history of internal conflicts between monarchs 
and nobles, traditionally has been suspicious of a standing army and has 
maintained only a small force, usually deployed or stationed abroad. Even 
today the British-dominated NATO Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters 
and the First UK Armoured Division remain stationed in Germany, fifteen 
years after the end of cold war.22 
All these, together with the fact that most of the fundamental principles in the 
field of civil–military relations date back to 19th century when the idea of standing 
professional armed forces was yet burgeoning and the threats were predominantly 
external, make the civil–military relations policies shaped within this context impractical, 
18 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), ix. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 This refers to David Pion Berlin’s concept of political sphere which includes human rights, internal 
security, and intelligence. 
21 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Reations,” 30. 
22 Thomas-Durrel Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in Who Guards the Guardians 
and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2006), 25. 
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even detrimental in extreme cases, in countries that face both internal and external 
threats.  
My thesis aims to draw attention to the “network-centricity and network-like traits 
of new security threats and challenges (such as terrorism and organized crime), and … 
the blurring of boundaries between domestic and external security threats,” and thus 
analyze the impacts of the new roles, dictated by this transformation, on civil–military 
relations in Turkey—with a particular emphasis on control and effectiveness balance. I 
expect the findings of this thesis will be useful to policymakers in Turkey, when shaping 
and reshaping policies related to effectively fighting the PKK.  
My thesis also seeks to serve as an empirical case study for the literature, and 
politicians and senior military personnel in countries that are dealing with both domestic 
and external threats. In addition, I aspire this thesis will be useful to policymakers and 
military personnel of the United States, in that it will provide an insight on civil–military 
relations in an important North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Feroz Ahmad argues that the military in Turkey “was an institution which never 
changed its world view, [and] that it stood above society and acted independently of it.”23 
This was a reality for a long time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic and this 
reality could still be observed when the PKK started its terrorist activities in the first half 
of the 1980s. As a result of this reality, counter-terrorism operations were initially more 
security oriented. This security oriented approach then evolved into a semi-militaristic 
approach, and ultimately into a multidimensional approach. Within the context of the first 
approach, a security oriented strategy, based on military-police-intelligence cooperation, 
has been adopted and the main focus of efforts has been fighting the armed terrorists.24 
The intelligence agency and police forces were placed under the leadership of the TAF 
during the period this approach was adopted, yet no civilian institution was 
                                                 
23 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993), 3. 
24 M. Sadi Bilgic, Dunden Bugune Kurt Sorunu ve PKK (Kurdish Problem and the PKK: The Past and 
Present) (Istanbul: Bilgesam Yayinlari, 2014), 64. 
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systematically included in the process. During the second period, “the focus shifted from 
fighting the armed terrorists to taking preemptive actions against them.”25 The main 
concern during this period was efficiency. Again, no civilian institution was included in 
this process. Within the context of multidimensional approach, though, in addition to 
intelligence agency and police forces, “many civilian actors and institutions like the 
universities, media, business and finance, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and 
even the public were incorporated”26 in the process and the efforts of all those actors 
were coordinated by civilian politicians or bureaucrats. The growing inclusion and 
increasing dominance of civilians indicate that the TAF’s inclusion in the fight against 
PKK has positively affected the civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey. By the 
time PKK terrorist activities started, the main factor affecting the roles and missions of 
the TAF was communist threat—both as a neighbor of the Soviet Russia and a member 
of NATO. By assuming the responsibility to fight against PKK, the TAF just added 
another mission to the list but the major roles of the TAF remained the same and this 
embarkation had no adverse effects on other responsibilities. This stability in roles and 
flexibility in missions not only helped TAF maintain its effectiveness but also added to it. 
Overall, I hypothesize that, together with other changes happening in a broader sense, the 
TAF’s role in the fight against PKK and the mutual cultural exposure of institutions 
involved in the process have positively affected both the civilian control and 
effectiveness of the armed forces in Turkey. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research will predominantly rely on empirical evidence for both civilian 
control and military effectiveness aspects of CMR. For empirical evidence I will 
extensively use secondary sources. Available statistical data (defense budget, acquisition, 
etc.) will also be used in related sections of both civilian control and effectiveness. 




E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will be organized into five chapters. After this introduction, the second 
chapter will provide theoretical background on CMR, roles and missions, and democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces. Third chapter will provide a historical background of 
CMR in Turkey, including the role of the armed forces in fighting PKK. The fourth 
chapter will test the hypotheses by providing an analysis of the civil–military relations in 
Turkey, in the context of the military taking in new leading roles in domestic security. 
The fifth chapter will provide a conclusion of the research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is rich literature on civil–military relations in a democracy. In this chapter, I 
will first draw attention to the penchant of CMR scholars towards civilian supremacy, 
present the reciprocal relation between CMR and democratic consolidation, define 
military effectiveness from a CMR perspective, and finally present the views of the 
scholars calling for the inclusion of military effectiveness in CMR.  
The main concern of CMR literature is the power relation between the civilians 
and soldiers. Scholars such as Clausewitz, Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer raised the 
questions of “Who has the authority to make what kinds of decisions? Who is 
accountable to whom? How are roles defined and resources allocated? And how is labor 
divided up, information shared, and blame assigned?”27 The efforts of the 
abovementioned scholars themselves and the scholars following in their footsteps have 
been directed towards answering these questions. 
A. GENERAL CONTEXT AND PENCHANT TOWARD CIVILIAN 
SUPREMACY 
Clausewitz, in his seminal book On War, argues that any effort directed towards 
the goal of finding a practical answer to the abovementioned questions must take civilian 
supremacy as a prerequisite. He states that 
the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and 
peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and 
replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. 
We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political 
intercourse, with the addition of other means.28  
Basically, he considers war a political process in which the military is included as an 
additional means, argues that the principles of politics still prevail, and claims “that the 
ends of war must be shaped by the political forces that began the conflict and continue to 
                                                 
27 Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians?, x. 
28 Carl von Clausewitz, “On Military Genius,” in On War (London: Routledge & K.Paul, 1962), 605. 
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operate throughout”29-which essentially means the civilian supremacy or the civilian 
control of the militaries. 
Clausewitz’s idea of civilian supremacy has been adopted by many scholars like 
Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer and has been the basic 
principle of many contemporary CMR concepts.  
Huntington, one of the leading scholars in the field of CMR, approaches the issue 
of CMR through a national security policy perspective, argues that national security 
policy exists in three forms (military security, internal security, and situational security) 
and two levels (operating level and institutional level), and defines CMR as the principal 
institutional component of military security policy.30 He further argues that “the 
objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil–military 
relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social 
values,”31 which is an implicit reference to a proper and sustainable balance between 
civilian control and military effectiveness. At this point, he defines officers as 
professionals in the “management of violence,”32 narrows the focus of CMR down to an 
adviser-client relationship between officer corps and the state—which is represented by 
the civilian politicians, and suggests that military officers, as service providers to the 
state, “cannot impose decisions upon [their] client which have implications beyond [their] 
field of special competence.”33  
For the accomplishment of both civilian control and military effectiveness, 
though, Huntington places the prime responsibility on the officer corps and tries to justify 
this through the introduction of three distinguishing characteristics of the profession: 
“expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”34 He defines expertise as “knowledge and 
                                                 
29 Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Political Control over the Use Of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective,” 
Library of Congress, 2001, 12, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12076/00338.pdf. 
30 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 1. 
31 Ibid., 2. 
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 Ibid., 16. 
34 Ibid., 8. 
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skill in a significant field of human endeavor”35 and concludes that expertise of the 
professional officership is “the management of violence.”36 Huntington builds his 
concept of responsibility on the notion that “the client of every profession is society”37 
and that the professional man is to “perform his service when required by the society.”38 
For responsibility of the professional officership, he argues that “the expertise of the 
officer imposes upon him a special social responsibility. The employment of this 
expertise promiscuously for his own advantage would wreck the fabric of society,”39 
therefore “the management of violence [should] be utilized only for socially approved 
purposes.”40 Huntington’s concept of corporateness is a broader form of esprit de corps41 
and suggests that “the interest of a profession requires it to bar its members form 
capitalizing upon professional competence in areas where that competence has no 
relevance.”42 Having drawn the context of officership as a profession and having set the 
ideals for this profession, Huntington argues that “officership is strongest and most 
effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal”43 and thus implicitly 
argues that both civilian control and military effectiveness are predominantly dependent 
on how close the officer corps gets to this professional ideal. Despite frequent references 
to military effectiveness, Huntington predominantly addresses the issue of civilian 
control.  
Samuel E. Finer, on the other hand, approaches the issue of CMR from a different 
perspective. He argues that professionalism is not enough for the military to stay away 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 11. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 14. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. Huntington argues that “the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and 
consciousness of themselves as a group.” 
42 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 10. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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from politics, and emphasizes the relevance of the acceptance by the armed forces of 
civilian “supremacy” as key in this context.44  
Finer, like Huntington himself, predominantly focuses on the civilian control 
aspect of CMR, only from a different perspective (military interventions), and places the 
prime responsibility on the military. He argues that the militaries have absolute 
superiority over civilians and once the opportunity to intervene appears it is up to the 
militaries to decide whether to intervene or not—a decision highly dependent on the 
disposition of the military.45 
Morris Janowitz, also like his contemporary colleague Samuel P. Huntington, 
considers the officer corps a professional group but his concept of professionalism does 
not confine the military in its occupational sphere. Instead, he argues that “the military 
have accumulated considerable power, and that power protrudes into the political fabric 
of contemporary society.”46 Thus, he argues that the military is not completely detached 
from political sphere, that it also has political behaviors, and introduces five hypotheses 
(“changing organizational authority,” “narrowing skill differential between military and 
civilian elites,” “shift in officer recruitment,” “significance of career patterns,” and “trend 
in political indoctrination”) to “understand the changes that have occurred in the political 
behavior of the … military.” 47 Later on, Janowitz adds another aspect that conditions the 
political behavior of the military: social and economic functions. He argues that “even 
where armies are limited in their political role, they have economic and social functions 
which influence political change.”48 Having defined the officer corps as a professional 
group with political tendencies, Janowitz argues that civilians accomplish civilian control 
of the armed forces by acting as a “pressure group”—that is political pressure.49 
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Janowitz’s conceptualization of CMR incorporates new elements like inherent political, 
economic, and social functions of the militaries but cannot divorce itself off the 
preoccupation with civilian control. 
B. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION 
Scholars, whose studies have been summarized above, have predominantly 
focused on the civilian control of the armed forces in an established democracy, and have 
placed the prime responsibility on the armed forces themselves. There is also a developed 
body of literature of civil–military relations and democratic consolidation.  
Adam Przeworski, for one, notes the relevance of civilian control of the military 
for democratic consolidation.50 Within this context of consolidated democracy; the 
military is just one of the many democratic institutions, and civil–military relations is just 
an interplay between the military and other democratic institutions, and the results of this 
interplay are subject to absolute compliance—that is civilian control.   
Phillippe C. Schmitter emphasizes the relevance of the military variable in 
democratic consolidation, when he specifically links the “Negotiation of a Military Pact” 
and “Submission of Military to Civilian Control” to successful democratic 
consolidation.51 Alfred Stepan introduces the military prerogatives and links the degree 
of these prerogatives with the effective institutionalization of democratic civilian control, 
and democratic consolidation.52   
                                                 
50 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37. 
51 Geoffrey Pridham, Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe (Dartmouth: University of Bristol- Centre For Mediterranean Studies, 
1995), 536–537, 541–564.  
52 Alfred Stepan introduces the military prerogatives model to explain the interplay between the two 
aspects which results in civilian control in varying degrees and which ultimately decides establishment and 
consolidation of democracy. He further adds that no democracy in the world is theoretically or empirically 
immune to a crisis that might eventually upset a once-consolidated model of civilian control. Stepan, 
Rethinking Military Politics, 98–101.  
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Bruneau and Tollefsonpoint out to the “centrality of civil–military relations in the 
transition to functioning democracy,”53 and define the issues of civil–military relations in 
all new and old democracies as an “ongoing conflict, negotiation, and compromise 
between those who hold power by virtue of free and fair elections and the organizations 
to which society has granted a monopoly on the means of violence.”54 They highlight the 
similarity between the civil–military relations challenges in both newer and older 
democracies, and further argue that “how these challenges are defined and resolved is 
fundamental for democratic consolidation and civil–military relations.”55 
Bruneau and Matei continue the study of the nature of civil–military relations in 
the process of democratic consolidation, and note the role of the armed forces before, 
during, and after the transition to democracy. For example, with regard to the particular 
case of Argentina, they argue that because of the “repressive and brutal”56 military 
dictatorship, “for decades the military carried the stigma of the non-democratic regime’s 
abuses,”57 and for this reason “much of the political energy and efforts of the democratic 
transition period between 1983 and 1990 were to deal with the military.”58 Same patterns 
occurred in the other military dictatorships in Latin America, which transitioned to 
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that 
militaries partaking in or supporting the dictatorships, and militaries hindering the 
transitional process are either immediately  forced out of the ‘political sphere’ and placed 
under strict civilian control by the politicians in the consolidation process, or disposed of 
these prerogatives in a phased process.59 
                                                 
53 Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians?, 2. 
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56 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina,” in The 
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57 Ibid. 
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59 In all three case studies of Argentina, Slovenia, and Spain under the ‘Control’ section of The 
Routledge Handbook of Civil – Military Relations; Bruneau, Matei, and Olmeda draw attention to a 
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C. DEFINING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS FROM A CIVIL–MILITARY 
RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE 
Another set of literature of civil–military relations includes the element of 
“effectiveness.” Brooks and Stanely, for example, argue that the fact that “cultural and 
societal factors, political institutions, and pressure from the international arena all shape 
how a state uses its resources,”60 imposes the inclusion of effectiveness in civil–military 
relations as an imperative.  
Risa A. Brooks, who has strongly advocated for the inclusion of effectiveness in 
civil–military relations concepts and extensively studied on ways to accomplish military 
effectiveness, argues that civilian control is a facilitating prerequisite for the effectiveness 
of the armed forces, which she describes as the level of translation of the armies’ “basic 
material and human strength into fighting power.”61 Having noted this, Brooks argues 
that military effectiveness is not only about having basic resources but also about the 
effective utilization of those resources, depending on the context, and is measured 
according to the degree to which a military exhibits four crucial attributes: 
the integration of military activity within and across different levels; 
responsiveness to internal constraints and to the external environment; 
high skill, as measured in the motivation and basic competencies of 
personnel; and high quality, as indicated by the caliber of a state’s 
weapons and equipment. An effective military is one that exhibits high 
levels of these four attributes.62 
Brooks further explains the process of creating an effective military through “The 
Causal Chain of Military Effectiveness,” which is illustrated in Table 1. She basically 
argues that an effective military can be described as one that have attained a high level of 
integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality through a process shaped by independent 
variables and military activities. Florina Cristiana Matei argues that the change in the 
overall security context, network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats 
and challenges, the blurring of the boundaries between external and internal threats, and 
                                                 
60 Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military 
Effectiveness (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 9,10. 
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the inclusion of police forces and intelligence agencies in fields that used to be 
exclusively dominated by the militaries in the past have made the need for the inclusion 
of effectiveness more acutely felt.63  
Table 1.   The Causal Chain of Military Effectiveness64 
 
 
The aforementioned four factors (cultural factors, societal factors, political 
institutions, and pressure from the international arena), together, 
constitute the environment in which a state’s military activities take place 
… By influencing these activities, a state’s society and its international 
environment affect how well it uses its material and human resources in 
the process of organizing and preparing for war and therefore its ability to 
create military power.65 
  
                                                 
63 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Reations,” 26. 
64 Brooks and Stanley, Creating Military Power, 9. 
65 Ibid., 1. 
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Paul Shemella, another civil–military relations scholar who is predominantly 
concerned about the effectiveness aspect of the problem, argues that “clearly defined 
military roles and missions are fundamental to the”66 accomplishment of military 
effectiveness in any given country.  
Having introduced this concept of roles and missions, Shemella draws attention to 
three crucial distinctions to be made within this context; (1) “distinction between roles 
and missions,” (2) “determining which roles are generally appropriate for military forces 
and which are not,” and (3) “the identification of roles and missions appropriate for the 
armed forces versus the police,” and further argues that “the inability to make this 
distinction clear enough, and to define the conditions under which those forces should 
work together, has often led governments to military and political failure.” 67 
Shemella argues that “roles operate at two different levels;” macro and micro 
roles. He defines macro roles as “roles given to the armed forces collectively, and relative 
to nonmilitary instruments of government power,” and the micro roles as “operational 
roles assigned to [individual services].”68 Table 2 shows the macro roles of the armed 
forces and the micro roles assigned to individual services in accord with those macro 
roles.69 
                                                 
66 Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 122. 
67 Ibid., 123–124. 
68 Ibid., 125. 
69 Shemella introduces a comprehensive list but cautions that this list is by no means exhaustive and 
that different macro and micro roles could be added to the list. 
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Table 2.   Attributes of Military Effectiveness70 
 
 
Having drawn the context for the roles, Shemella introduces a distinction between 
“traditional” and “nontraditional” missions, and argues that “missions can be 
synchronized more easily with the roles they support from such a perspective.”71 
Shemella maintains that sustaining the connection between roles and missions, and 
accomplishing stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to military 
effectiveness.72 
Basically, both scholars argue for the necessity to include effectiveness in civil–
military relations concepts and they all maintain that civilian control is a prerequisite for 
                                                 
70 Brooks and Stanley, Creating Military Power, 15. 
71 Shemella, “Roles and Missions,” 136. 
72 Ibid., 130. 
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effectiveness and those two aspects cannot be divorced off. While Matei is predominantly 
concerned with the balance, or tradeoff, between democratic civilian control and 
effectiveness, Brooks and Shemella are primarily concerned with effectiveness itself. 
Brooks describes military effectiveness as a high level of integration, responsiveness, 
skill, and quality and primarily focuses on ways to accomplish this effectiveness. 
Shemella, on the other hand, focuses on sustaining military effectiveness. He makes a 
distinction between roles and missions and argues that effectiveness can be sustained 
through stability in roles and flexibility in missions. 
D. ACQUIRING AND SUSTAINING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS  
As also mentioned by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “there are no easy 
answers, no quick fixes, no simple formulas for the achievement of military 
effectiveness.”73 The fact that “military effectiveness [still] remains an ill-defined 
concept,” further adds to the challenge.74 Yet, despite its challenging and ambiguous 
nature, there is a consensus among scholars on the definition of military effectiveness. 
Millett, Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman define military effectiveness as “the process by 
which the armed forces convert resources into fighting power,” and argue that “a fully 
effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from resources physically 
and politically available.”75 Brooks provides a similar definition and describes military 
effectiveness “as the capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in 
wealth, technology, population size, and human capital.”76 Both definitions define 
effectiveness as a conversion process and focus on the creation/acquisition of 
effectiveness. Shemella, on the other hand provides a roadmap for the sustainment of 
military effectiveness through the concept of roles and missions. In this section, I will 
first focus on accomplishment/acquisition of military effectiveness through the ‘causal 
                                                 
73 Allan Reed Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Mershon Center Series on 
International Security and Foreign Policy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
74 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military 
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chain of military effectiveness’ introduced by Brooks, and then focus on the sustainment 
of military effectiveness through the roles and missions concept of Shemella.  
Brooks’ causal chain of military effectiveness basically represents the translation 
process of the afore mentioned resources into a high level of integration, responsiveness, 
skill, and quality (which together form military effectives) under the influence of 
independent variables (“culture, social structure, political institutions, civil–military 
relations, interstate competition, global norms, international organizations”77) and 
through the utilization of military activities (“strategic assessment processes, 
procurement, strategic command and control, intelligence and internal monitoring, officer 
selection-promotion and rotation, tactical command and control, training and 
education”78). 
The most crucial parts of Brooks’ theory are the four properties of an effective 
military. Brooks argues that “all four properties—integration, responsiveness, skill, and 
quality—are essential to military effectiveness. A state that has shortcomings in just one 
attribute is likely to be handicapped in generating power in the event of an interstate 
dispute.”79 These four attributes, though, are the end products of Brooks’ causal chain. 
The initiators/causes of this chain are “culture, social structure, political and economic 
institutions, and international factors, including global norms, competition, and 
international organizations.”80 
Having defined the resources, the end products those resources are translated into, 
and the causes that start the process, Brooks introduces a set military activities as a 
“translation mechanism”: (1) strategic assessment and coordination processes, (2) 
weapons and equipment procurement process, (3) strategic command and control, (4) 
intelligence and internal monitoring, (5) officer selection, rotation, and promotion 
procedures, (6) tactical command and control,  and (7) training and military education.81  
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 13. 
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 21 
Basically, the causal chain of military effectiveness seeks to find an answer to the 
question of how states create military power. Despite the inclusion of a set of resources, 
Brooks acknowledges that “the sources of military power are … far more diverse.”82 
Still, the processes and procedures included in this concept provide a roadmap for the 
creation of military power/effectiveness, with slight differences depending on the 
resources, independent variables, and military activities included. 
As for the sustainment of military effectiveness, Shemella argues that “clearly 
defined military roles and missions are fundamental to the structuring of any state’s 
defense establishment and to decision making about the use of armed force.”83 He draws 
attention to three acts of distinction, which are the distinction between roles and missions, 
the necessity to determine “which roles and missions are generally appropriate for 
military forces and which are not,”84 and the “identification of roles and missions 
appropriate for the armed forces versus the police”85 
In addition to the above-mentioned distinctions, Shemella makes a distinction 
between macro and micro roles—also shown in Table 3. He defines macro roles as the 
“roles given to the armed forces collectively, and relative to nonmilitary instruments of 
government power,” and argues that “macro roles operate at the policy level, where 
governments decide how military forces will be used generally in domestic and foreign 
affairs.”86 As for micro roles, Shemella defines them as roles individually assigned to 
services, and argues that “micro roles determine how national security organizations will 
be used relative to one another, and which types of forces are appropriate for such 
uses.”87 
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Table 3.   Micro Roles for Armed Forces and Law Enforcement88 
 
 
Shemella also makes a distinction between traditional and nontraditional 
missions, which he argues “comes from the field, where military missions are 
performed.”89 He further argues that “missions can be synchronized more easily with the 
roles they support from such a perspective.”90 Table 4 shows a list of traditional and 
nontraditional missions. It is important to note here that this list is not rigid and can be 
changed depending on a variety of factors. Shemella argues that this non-rigid nature of 
the list has become even more apparent in the wake of Cold War.91 
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Table 4.   Mission Characteristics92 
 
 
Overall, Shemella argues that it is imperative to make a distinction between roles 
and missions, but at the same time establish a hierarchical link between them. Once 
accomplished, effectiveness can be more easily sustained if the missions are shaped in 
accordance with the roles they support. Basically, stability in roles and flexibility in 
missions is key to the successful sustainment of effectiveness. 
E. THE INCLUSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN CIVIL–
MILITARY RELATIONS CONCEPTS 
This literature on democratic consolidation and civil–military relations also 
predominantly focuses on achieving civilian control, and very little on the issue of 
military effectiveness. Having realized this, several scholars of democratic consolidation 
and civil–military relations, point out the need to include effectiveness in the civil–
military relations conceptual framework. In his article “Making Strategy: Civil–Military 
Relations after Iraq,” Hew Strachan draws attention to this necessity and argues that  
the principal purpose of effective civil–military relations is national 
security; its output is strategy. Democracies tend to forget that. They have 
come to address civil–military relations not as a means to an end, not as a 
way of making the state more efficient in its use of military power, but as 
an end in itself. Instead the principal objective, to which others become 
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secondary, has been the subordination of the armed forces to civil 
control.93  
Basically, he argues that democratic civilian control of the armed forces is not the 
ultimate goal, but rather a means to accomplish other goals—including effectiveness. 
Likewise, a comprehensive study that addresses the issues of civilian control and 
effectiveness of the armed forces is provided by Bruneau and Tollefsoni. The authors 
place a special emphasis on the institutions94 and highlight their importance in 
determining civil–military relations.95 After introducing the actors and institutions 
partaking in civil–military relations and their contributions to the processes and 
procedures, the authors respectively address the issues of roles and missions—which 
directly relate to effectiveness- and democratic civilian control of the militaries.  
The idea of effectiveness of the military is based on distribution of tasks accepted 
by all parties, and clearly defined roles and missions within the context of this 
distribution. The tasks of politicians are to “define threats, determine political objectives, 
set the broad parameters of strategy, build coalitions, and provide resources” while that of 
the soldiers are to “argue their case, take the resources allocated to them, and apply force 
to achieve the political goals as defined by the political leaders.”96 Arguing that “macro 
roles help governments create a vision, micro roles determine which military forces will 
be used to achieve that vision, and missions are the vehicle by which they do it,” and 
highlighting the importance of continuous synchronization between missions and roles, 
Paul Shemella makes a further distinction between missions; traditional and 
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 25 
nontraditional.97 Nontraditional missions have been dictated by changing domestic and 
international conditions but are not a substitute for traditional missions. Militaries might 
have to perform both traditional and nontraditional missions at the same time. Although 
Shemella claims that this obligation places the militaries under the risk of becoming less 
capable, he argues that sustaining the connection between roles and missions, and 
accomplishing stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to military 
effectiveness.98 Bruneau and colleagues have divided the issue of democratic civilian 
control into different subsets (intelligence, defense budget, recruitment, and professional 
military education) and tried to bring an explanation through the conduct of politicians 
and militaries in those subsets. 
The single focus of the literature on civilian control and negligence of 
effectiveness has been noted by Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei. They argue that 
the “almost exclusive focus on civilian control in literature is a significant impediment to 
understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and 
security forces, particularly when we consider the very wide spectrum of roles and 
missions,” and add that the contemporary challenge to CMR is “not only to assert and 
maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries and other security instruments to 
implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”99 Within this context, they introduce 
“a new conceptualization with three dimensions: democratic control, effectiveness, and 
efficiency,”100 and six categories of roles and missions: “(1) fight, and be prepared to 
fight, external wars, (2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies, (3) 
fight global terrorism, (4) fight crime, (5) provide support for humanitarian assistance, (6) 
prepare for and execute peace support operations.”101 Having listed the roles and 
missions, Bruneau and Matei argue that “democratic control depends less on the roles and 
missions that are assigned, such as the armed forces doing police work, than on the mix 
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of security instruments and how the control mechanisms are institutionalized.”102 Thus, 
Bruneau and Matei argue that  
the three elements of CMR must be assessed as interdependent parts of a 
whole in a democratic context. Each of the three is necessary, and 
individually none is sufficient. Civilian control is basic and fundamental, 
but is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can 
effectively fulfil their roles and missions. And, both control and 
effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will 
vitiate other national priorities.103 
As observed in the studies of contemporary CMR scholars, a proper balance 
between civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces better conceptualizes 
democratic civil–military relations.  
Matei and Bruneau add another aspect to this new conceptualization; efficiency, 
that is “fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost.”104 Bruneau argues 
that efficiency is one of the third requirements for effectiveness but highlights the 
challenges in assessing or measuring the efficiency in areas of national security, defense, 
and civil–military relations—in the sense that it is done in other areas.105 He cites three 
reasons for these challenges: 
first, measuring the efficiency of the security forces is complicated by the 
wide variety of roles and missions as well as the difficulty in establishing 
measures of effectiveness for any one, let alone a combination of one. 
Second, because security is a public good or activity, where the so-called 
bottom line does not apply, there is no market mechanism to assign a 
value to whether an activity is being done efficiently, that is, making profit 
or not. Third, competition, in the form of a peer government within the 
same territorial boundaries, is not at work.106 
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Having noted that, Bruneau argues that applying the concept of efficiency, in its 
traditional sense, to the process of the “use of resources for national security and defense 
is … misleading” and that “what governments require, at a minimum, is some kind of 
oversight mechanism to monitor the budget and spending.”107  
This thesis aspires to complete these bodies of literature. It hopes to provide a 
discussion and assessment of current the civil–military relations and democratic 
consolidation in Turkey, utilizing both elements of civil–military relations: control and 
effectiveness. 
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III. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL–MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN TURKEY  
In this section, I will analyze the state tradition in Turkey, the exact position of 
the TAF within this traditional framework, and the shifts in both the state tradition and 
the position of the TAF throughout history. 
Absolute monarchy has been the traditional government type in the Asiatic 
culture (Turkish, Chinese, Indian, Russian, Persian, and Arabian).108 The only state in 
this group that has successfully completed its transition to democracy in the last century 
is Japan. Turkey, on the other hand, is an important example of a country in the late 
phases of this transition.109 The distinguishing aspect of the Asiatic type of absolute 
monarchy (which calls for the rule of a single person (emperor) with unlimited 
administrative, legislative, and judicial authority) is the “necessity for the monarch to be 
a civilian” and Turkey (Ottomans and Seljuks back in history) is no exception.110 
Ataturk’s resignation at the outset of the war of liberation and his partaking in the fight as 
a civilian leader from that time on, is a decision partly dictated by this tradition. 
In order to be able to analyze the state tradition, its effects on civil–military 
relations, and the exact position of the armed forces within this context more accurately, 
the Turkish history should be divided into two separate parts: (1) the Ottoman Empire 
era, and (2) the modern Turkish Republic era.111 
A. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
During the Ottoman time, the armed forces were traditionally considered one of 
the main assets of the monarch (emperor); therefore, with the exception of the years of 
decline, “the armed forces had never been the dominant party in CMR.”112 But, as Feroz 
                                                 






Ahmad argues, during the years of decline, the same army, in collaboration with the 
ulema (men of religion), got actively engaged in palace politics and became the main 
hindrance in front of reforms.113  
This threat posed by the conduct of the military during the years of decline led the 
reformist emperors to start every modernization process with the military, which led to 
the introduction of Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) in the 19th century. Within the context of 
these efforts, “military schools and academies based on the western model were set up,” 
many officers and cadets were sent abroad for education and teams of foreign advisors 
(predominantly French and German) were invited to the country, and “out of these … 
emerged a new generation of reformist officers dedicated to the salvation of their state 
and empire.”114 This new generation of reformist officers not only aspired to lead the 
nation through a modernization process but also started to question and challenge the 
state, which was embodied in the persona of the emperor. Along with many benefits both 
for the armed forces and the civilians, this self-assumed leadership role also caused a 
detachment that eventually created an isolated military community and thus a civil–
military gap.  
B. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE MODERN TURKISH 
REPUBLIC 
The previously-mentioned role “assumed by the armed forces in the mid-19th
century became even stronger in the first years of the modern Turkish Republic,”115 and 
together with its “sacred mission,”116 “created a deep respect for and confidence in the 
TAF.”117 
113 Ahmad, Modern Turkey, 2. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Salih Akyurek et al., Sivil-Asker Iliskileri Ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi (Ankara: BILGESAM 
Yayinlari, 2014), 135. 
116 Turkish word used for sacred in this occasion is “kutsal,” which conveys the message that the 
power and the mission of the TAF is not derivative of any earthly power or figure, but of the creator. 
117 Ibid. 
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The TAF played an “inevitably effective role”118 during the War of Liberation 
and made vital contributions to the state and nation building process after the war.119 
Along with the heritage from the Ottoman Empire, this role it assumed at a “time when 
foreign policy, domestic policy, and military issues were all interwoven,” helped the TAF 
acquire an influential position over the politics.120 To explain this situation, Feroz Ahmad 
argues that “the emphasis on the army’s role in Turkish history and politics, from 
Ottoman times to the present, suggests a continuity which seems plausible. It assumes 
that the army was an institution which never changed its world view, that it stood above 
society and acted independently of it.”121 
Yet, this continuity mentioned by Feroz Ahmad witnessed a short break during 
the single-party period under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu. Both leaders were 
well aware of the opposition from the prominent commanders of the War of Liberation 
(Huseyin Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Kazim Karabekir) and the 
substantial support to these figures from the military. The main disturbances of these 
prominent commanders were the proclamation of republic and designation of Ankara as 
the new capital—both of which were considered to be acts of disrespect to the imperial 
heritage.122 Thus, in an effort to stem this perceived serious threat from the military, the 
prominent generals were forced to retire from the military and also disqualified from 
politics during Ataturk’s lifetime.123 This attitude of Ataturk towards the military was 
sustained by Inonu and 
throughout the single-party period (1923–1945) the army was completely 
isolated from political life. Officers were told to retire if they wanted to 
enter politics … those who chose to serve the republic in uniform were not 
even permitted to vote. The army was given a place of honour in the 
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republic but it was also removed from the mainstream of the social and 
political life of the country.124 
To ensure the civilian control of the military during the single-party period, along 
with “traditional mechanism of civilian control (limits on the mission, limits on the size, 
limits on the budget, constitutional and legal limitations, culture of professionalism, 
societal norms, and free press),”125 both Ataturk and Inonu adopted three additional 
precautionary methods: (1) highlighting their military background as prominent generals, 
(2) appointing allegiant generals to key positions,126 and (3) “satisfying the self-esteem 
of the officer corps by making the Chief of General Staff (CGS) a more influential figure 
than Minister of Defense (MoD).”127 The exclusion of the officer corps from the 
mainstream social and political life as a result of the control mechanism imposed on 
them, created a considerable civil–military gap and a plausible detachment on the part of 
the soldiers, which only started to fade away as the Cold War brought the TAF back into 
the mainstream. 
After the end of the Second World War, numerous internal and external factors 
forced the Inonu administration to initiate a transitional process to multiparty system. 
Zürcher argues that Turkey’s growing concerns in the face of explicit Russian demands 
for correction of borders; Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which were aimed at 
supporting the defense of free nations who were under the threat of foreign pressure or 
militant minority violence inside their borders; and Turkish leadership’s efforts toward 
fully profiting from the American military and political support through the adoption of 
political and economic ideals championed by the Americans (democracy and free 
enterprise) could all be cited as external factors facilitating the transition to multiparty 
system.128 In addition to the abovementioned factors, Turkey’s partaking in the 1945 San 
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Francisco conference as a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and commitment 
to democratic ideals through the signing of UN charter can also be counted among 
external factors. As for the domestic factors, Zürcher argues that; the estrangement 
between the single-party regime and the masses (peasants and industrial workers), the 
lack of improvement in the standard of living, excessive taxing of the government over 
country-side, rising cost of living, the withdrawal of the support of Young Turk 
Coalition, and the suspicion inflicted by the varlik vergisi (wealth tax)129 on the Turkish 
bourgeoisie are all the domestic factors facilitating the transition process.130 
In the first multi-party elections held in 1946, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) 
(DP) was able to win only 62 of the 465 seats; yet, as Zürcher argues, this was mainly the 
result of massive vote rigging and administrative frauds in the electoral process on the 
part of Republican People’s Party (RPP)—a claim he supports with the immediate 
destroying of the actual ballot boxes after the results were announced.131 After the 
adoption of the open counting of votes and supervision of the elections by the judiciary, 
DP gained a sweeping victory in the 1950 elections, which Feroz Ahmad argues was 
brought by DP’s successful exploitation of “the public’s memory of past grievances”132 
towards RPP, and repetitive promises of democratic and economic development. Yet DP 
failed to fulfill the promises and meet the expectations of the public. Their self-perception 
of “themselves as the architects of contemporary Turkey who alone understood what was 
best for the country”133 and the growing feeling of insecurity despite successive electoral 
victories, led to their adoption of oppressive and exclusive policies towards opposition 
parties and other state institutions (including the TAF), which were deemed as the 
extension of RPP.  
The military was also going through a transformation process during this period. 
In addition to structural changes made possible through foreign military aids, Turkey’s 
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accession to NATO in 1952, and growing number of officers being trained abroad, or at 
least being exposed to the realities of foreign armed forces, and thus being “brought out 
of political shade into the limelight (especially during the Korean War)”134 created 
conditions highly reminiscent of Nizam-i Cedid. It is important to note here that those 
changes were predominantly happening at junior level. 
Despite all those structural and intellectual changes happening in the TAF, the DP 
leadership adopted the same techniques as Ataturk and Inonu, and thought that changing 
the commanding generals in the armed forces would suffice to keep the TAF under 
control. This, together with the explicit hostility of DP leadership against officer corps 
(prime minister Adnan Menderes once “threatened to run [the TAF] with reserve officers 
if the regular officers failed to behave responsibly”135), led to the 1960 coup which, in a 
rare fashion, happened out of the command structure. Even the CGS “became aware that 
a military coup d’état had taken place at three o’clock in the morning of 27 May 1960 
only when a declaration read by Colonel Alparslan Turkes was broadcast on Turkish 
radio.”136  
Thus, ten years after its first electoral victory, DP rule came to an end through a 
military coup in 1960. “This coup started a period throughout which the TAF acted as the 
primary political actor that shaped all political processes”137 and thus enjoyed the 
ultimate liberty of “ruling but not governing.”138 As Yaprak Gursoy argues; with every 
intervention after the 1960 coup, the autonomy of the TAF increased and through legal 
safeguards (especially constitutional regulations in 1971 and 1980) that autonomy 
evolved into an unnamed veto power, which severely limited the authority of the 
governments.139 “It was only after 1999 that the political autonomy of the TAF started to 
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decrease.”140 Karen Kaya also acknowledges the year 1999 as a turning point in civil–
military relations in Turkey and argues that in 1999, Turkey’s bid for European Union 
(EU) candidacy was approved, and with this approval a process of harmonization of 
Turkey’s laws according to EU regulations was started, among which civilian control of 
the armed forces was one of the most important.141 
Despite the sincerity of the members of National Unity Committee (NUC) to hand 
power back to the politicians after a general election; the 1961 “constitution … gave the 
military High Command a role in the government”142 through the National Security 
Council (NSC). Although the council’s function was limited to assisting the cabinet in 
matters related to national security, the generals had a say in almost every issue because 
back then “from rice price to roads and touristic sites, there [was] … not a single problem 
in this country which [was] … not related to national security.”143 
Ahmad argues that, with the Bill passed in March 1962, “the power and influence 
of the NSC was increased [to a level that] allowed the body to interfere in the 
deliberations of the cabinet through regular consultations and participation in preparatory 
discussions.”144 Under these circumstances, the TAF gained the upper hand in civil–
military relations, and became both a partner of the government in the executive process 
and the legitimate guardian of the state. 
The return to democracy after a short period of military rule, and the level of 
freedoms introduced by the 1961 constitution increased the political, social, and physical 
mobility of people. Things that would normally increase the quality of democracy in any 
country, created a chaos in Turkey. A short description of the situation during that time is 
provided by Ahmad: 
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By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities 
has ceased to function. Students emulating Latin American urban guerillas 
robbed banks and kidnapped U.S. service-men, and attacked American 
targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government 
were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike and more 
workdays were lost between 1 January and 12 March 1971 than during 
any prior year. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and 
its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Ataturk and Kemalism, 
infuriating the armed forces.145 
Zurcher argues that; in order to stem the ongoing anarchy and “forestall a coup by 
junior officers on the pattern of that of May 1960,”146 on 12 March 1971 the CGS handed 
an ultimatum in the form of a memorandum to the prime minister, which demanded the 
formation of a strong and credible government to end the anarchy.147 As a result most of 
the freedoms introduced by the 1961 constitution were either completely abolished or 
curbed. Yet this could not stop anarchy form evolving into political violence.  
In the face of growing violence and failure to restore order by the politicians, the 
TAF took “over the administration of the country in accordance with its Internal Service 
Act which assigns to them the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting the Turkish 
Republic.”148 In his foreword to 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, General 
Kenan Evren argues that 
it is incorrect to interpret the Armed Forces’ take-over of the state 
administration in 12 September 1980 as their entry into the political arena. 
This action was carried through as an obligation, for there was no other 
way of preventing the  breakdown and destruction of the nation and the 
state. The whole operation, however, was conducted within the framework 
of the existing chain of command, based on the principle of absolute 
obedience, to ensure that the Armed Forces themselves did not get stuck in 
the quagmire of politics.149 
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Yet, in stark contrast with this argument, “the military leaders did not forget to take steps 
that would ensure the continuing presence and influence of their institution at the highest 
level of political decision making.”150 Unlike the 1960 coup, following the end of junta 
regime in 1983, a general, Kenan Evren, took over the presidency, after simultaneously 
serving as both the president and the general chief of staff for one year. Thus, the 
military, under Kenan Evren’s presidency and through NSC, became “the highest, non-
elected, decision making  body of the [Turkish state].”151 
Gerassimos Karabelias argues that civil–military relations in Turkey passed 
through three stages in the post-junta period: “first when Kenan Evren was the President 
and Turgut Ozal the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic (1983–89), the second when 
Ozal occupied the seat of the President (1989–93), and the third, the post Ozal period 
(1993–95).”152 With the exception of the presidency of Turgut Ozal, the military 
continued to have the upper hand in civil–military relations and this continued up until 
1999.  
In 1997, the military, through a NSC resolution, forced the Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan to accept the implementation of certain steps aimed towards the 
stemming of Islamic radicalization. These steps included: 
1. the transfer of all schools, student lodgings and foundations affiliated with 
Islamist groups to the Ministry of Education (MoE) 
2. the implementation of eight year compulsory education and the placement 
of all courses teaching Quran under the authority of MoE in order to 
protect new generations from the impacts of groups with Islamist agendas 
3. the cessation of all activities of the groups that have been banned with 
Law no. 677—that is Islamist denominations 
4. the introduction of necessary precautions to end the manipulation of the 
cases of officers that have been sacked from the TAF due to their Islamist 
affiliations in a way to present the TAF as opposed to religion 
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5. the adoption of the precautions that have been used by the TAF to prevent 
Islamists from infiltrating into the armed forces by other government 
institutions 
6. the inhibition of Iran’s pro-Islamist activities in Turkey 
7. the prohibition of the activities of all radical Islamist groups 
8. the banning of practices that would undermine Turkey’s modern identity 
9. the prohibition of the donation of sheep hides to Islamist groups in order 
to provide them with financial support 
10. the strict implementation of Law no. 5816 to prevent disrespectful acts and 
statements against Ataturk153 
These steps, which were specifically designed to target the majority of Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi-RP) constituency, eventually led to the resignation of Erbakan. The 
similarity between the 1971 intervention and the 1997 “postmodern coup” shows how 
less the power balance between the military and the civilians had changed.  
The EU membership process requirements, though, cushioned the impacts of the 
1997 “postmodern coup.” Unlike the two other enlargement countries at the time (Malta 
and Cyprus), Turkey was not granted the opportunity to start accession negotiations until 
2005, and the opening of accession negotiations was made conditional upon the 
fulfilment of “the Copenhagen political criteria for membership.”154 Between 1999 and 
2005 the main focus of all political efforts was the harmonization of Turkish laws and 
regulations with the Copenhagen Criteria, which are categorized into three different 
groups: 
1. political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities 
2. economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competition and market forces 
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3. administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the 
acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership155 
Nilufer Narli argues that with the beginning of European Union (EU) 
negotiations, civil–military relations went through significant cultural and political 
changes. Cultural changes include the following: (1) changes in political and security 
culture, (2) changes in the mindset and socialization process of the officer corps, and (3) 
changes decreasing the informal influence mechanisms of the military.156 Political 
changes include the following: (1) media criticism of military transparency and 
increasing number of academic studies on civil–military relations, (2) public opinion 
against military existence in political sphere, (3) increasing narrative of conscientious 
objection, and (4) the transfer of the task of protecting the democracy and secularism 
from military to civilian institutions.157 Thus, through these cultural and political 
changes, partly made possible by the EU membership negotiations, “the autonomy and 
political authority of the TAF has been significantly curbed, and as a result of this, a more 
democratic civil–military relations context has been established.”158  
In order to better analyze the curbing effect of this negotiation process on the 
autonomy and political authority of the TAF, Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt focus on the 
institutions and practices used by the TAF and the effects of “harmonization 
packages”159 on these.  
The fist institution they analyze is the NSC, which they consider “the main 
obstacle in Turkey’s DECAF.”160 Through “an amendment to the Constitutional Article 
118, the role of the NSC was limited to develop recommendations. The government 
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became only responsible for evaluating the recommendations rather than giving them 
priority consideration,”161 and thus “the role of the NSC was reduced to that of an 
advisory/consultative body.”162 Toktas and Kurt list the other important changes 
regarding the NSC as the change in the number of civilian and military members from 5–
5 to 9–5, in favor of the civilians; the lifting of the obligation for NSC Secretary General 
to be a military person; and the abrogation of provisions in various laws and articles 
giving the NSC the authority to nominate members to different boards such as the Higher 
Education Council and the Supreme Board of Radio and Television.163  
State Security Court System is another institution that Toktas and Kurt label as 
the symbol of “the shadow of the military authority over civilian agencies.”164 There was 
a military judge in these courts, which were tasked with overseeing cases related to terror 
and political crimes. Through this structure, State Security Courts legalized the presence 
of the armed forces in the judiciary. Although not directly related to the State Security 
Courts, the Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military 
Courts, which authorized the military courts to try in civilians for “criminal offense[s] … 
such as inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience, [and] discouraging the public from 
military duty and undermining national resistance,” also provided the TAF with a 
legitimate presence in the judiciary. Both were abolished through amendments made 
within the context of harmonization packages. 
The harmonization packages did not only seek to break military dominance over 
civilians but also enhanced civilian control mechanism. Toktas and Kurt argue that the 
decision to appoint a court of auditors to “audit the accounts and transactions of all types 
of organizations, including the state properties owned by the TAF”165 was a step taken to 
enhance the transparency of defense expenditures, and thus establish a mechanism of 
civilian control over the military. 
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As also argued by Toktas and Kurt, “all these reforms challenged the status quo 
under which the military had occupied a privileged position and consolidated its 
hegemony over Turkey’s civilian governments,” and eventually curbed the autonomy and 
political authority of the TAF.166    
C. BACKGROUND ON THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND ITS 
IMPACTS ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
Starting from the early years of 1980s, the PKK gradually became the most 
determinative factor in civil–military relations in Turkey, because it was a direct threat to 
the integrity of the state and the ‘defender’ role of the TAF forced it to assume the 
leading role in the fight against the PKK. Therefore, it is important to analyze the PKK at 
this point.  
Since “the strategic introduction of terror to the political sphere as a proto-polity 
in the modern sense … following the French Revolution,”167 the world has witnessed 
different types of terrorism in different regions. The PKK promotes one of these types or 
forms of terrorism. The PKK, which was officially founded on November 27, 1978 was 
no exception. It was founded as a political party with a goal to promote the idea of an 
independent Kurdish state and later on “to establish a left-wing Kurdish state which 
would serve as a platform for the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the 
creation of a series of allied Marxist-Leninist states, throughout the Middle East.”168 Yet 
this appeal of PKK and its armed violence could not gain much support among the 
predominantly Sunni-Muslim Kurdish population, and this eventually made the Kurds 
living in the region the main victims of the PKK violence.  
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PKK’s “main area of operations has been the predominantly Kurdish provinces of 
southeast Turkey where it conducts a rural insurgency targeting security forces and state 
officials, and institutions. A primary area of operations is the provinces along the border 
with northern Iraq, such as Hakkâri and Sirnak, which the PKK use to infiltrate into 
Turkey from bases and staging areas in the Qandil mountains area of northern Iraq.”169 
Along with terrorist attacks in the aforementioned region against both the security forces 
and local population, the PKK, through TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kürdistan/Kurdistan 
Freedom Falcons), which is an offshoot of the PKK operating in urban areas, has carried 
out indiscriminate bombings and suicide attacks in urban regions. In addition to the 
existing organs, the PKK leadership founded KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan/Kurdistan 
Communities Union), which is an umbrella organization for all PKK affiliates,170 in an 
effort to both “display the image of a political structure”171 and “transfer the armed 
struggle to cities.”172 The structure of the KCK is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  The Structure of KCK173 
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Despite being recognized as a terrorist organization by many international bodies 
(NATO, EU) and countries, the PKK has enjoyed a continuous support in the 
international arena.  
In the period 1984–1998, the PKK maintained training bases in Syria and 
then Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, particularly the Bekaa Valley, as 
well as ideological training and indoctrination bases in Greece and western 
Europe, primarily in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Some PKK 
units operated out of Iran, although the camps on Iranian territory were 
mainly used for rest and recuperation rather than for military or 
ideological training. The PKK also had a presence in the Caucasus, 
Russia, North America, and most countries in Europe, where sympathizers 
conducted propaganda and fundraising activities.174  
Today the training camps and logistical bases have been confined to the Qandil 
region in Northern Iraq, yet the organization still has functional support bases in 
Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium and also recruitment bases in France.175 From 1980s 
to the 2000s, PKK enjoyed substantial amount of support from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Greek 
Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Armenia, and Russia.176 In addition to these, 
intelligence sources name 31 countries, providing weapons to PKK, some of which are 
NATO members; Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary.177 
In order to fund its terrorist activities PKK uses a wide range of methods: Forced 
donations and fund raisings in both south-eastern Turkey and Europe, human and 
narcotics trafficking, extortions, robberies, and foreign funding.178 
                                                 









D. IMPACTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MISSIONS ON MILITARY 
AUTONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE TAF 
Military autonomy is not essentially affiliated under democratic civilian control 
yet it is closely related to it. For this reason, I have included military autonomy in this 
section where I will provide a background on the effects of the fight against PKK on the 
democratic civilian control of TAF.  
Military autonomy, which basically is the “authority and roles left on the military 
side of the distinction line between civilian and military authority,”179 has been described 
to have two aspects: (1) professional autonomy, (2) political autonomy.180 The functions 
in each sphere of autonomy, as framed out by David Pion-Berlin, are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Spheres of Professional and Political Autonomy181 
Although not completely clear in any given country, this distinction between these 
two spheres is even more ambiguous in Turkey. The TAF has traditionally been assertive 
in the Political Sphere throughout the history of the modern Turkish Republic and at 
certain times (through coups and interventions) has tried to institutionalize its intrusion in 
the Political Sphere through the changing of constitution and foundation of bodies like 
the NSC. With the assignment of the task of the fight against the PKK, which falls under 
Internal Security and extensively incorporates Intelligence, the TAF has become even 
more involved in the Political Sphere. As also argued by Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, with the 
assumption of the leading role in the fight against the PKK, the TAF has combined 
“external defense with an internal security function” and thus has, inevitably, become 
more involved in political processes related to national security—mostly through the 
NSC.  
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Although the encouraged and aspired course of action for armed forces of any 
given country, including Turkey, is to stay out of the Political Sphere, the duties assigned 
to the TAF made this impossible. As also seen in Figure 2, “Internal Security” and 
“Intelligence Gathering” are two of three things left for the exclusive authority of 
civilians. It was argued in previous sections that the PKK was a direct threat to the 
internal security and that, in the face of inadequacy of other government institutions (the 
police and gendarmerie); it was obliged to assume the leading role in the fight against the 
PKK and thus became the prime actor in the shaping of internal security policies. As for 
intelligence gathering, Sakallioglu argues that, 
in addition to the military’s own intelligence operation units, the National 
Intelligence Agency of Turkey (NIA) serves as the civilian-based 
intelligence center subject to prime ministerial control. Despite its civilian 
character, the head and key cadres of NIA have always been recruited 
from officers and generals, either retired or active.182  
Essentially, the need for credible intelligence forced the TAF to cooperate with 
the NIA and the need for more efficient cooperation led to a growing military presence 
within the NIA. This, eventually, resulted in a quasi-monopoly of the TAF over 
intelligence gathering, which is supposed to be under the exclusive authority of the 
civilians.  
E. CONVENTIONAL CMR METHODS (INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES) 
IN TURKEY  
CMR are carried out through both formal and informal methods. In countries with 
robustly institutionalized armed forces, civil–military relations methods tend to be 
predominantly formal; given that both the politicians and the military have respect for 
professional and political spheres of autonomy.  
During the Ottomans and Seljuks the armed forces lacked institutional identity. 
Just like any other state entity, the armed forces were considered to be the emperor’s 
personal asset and therefore civil–military relations in this era, if any, were 
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predominantly informal. All the orders and directives from the emperor were perceived 
as sacred decrees and obediently carried out. All the feedbacks to the emperor, on the 
other hand, were presented in the form a withdrawn and courteous petition, with no 
expectation of consideration by the emperor. The only exceptions to this fashion were the 
sporadic revolts and coups of the Janissaries, which were not against the regime but the 
persona of the emperors. 
A similar type of relationship can also be observed in the first decades of the 
modern Turkish Republic, under Ataturk and Inonu, both of whom were prominent 
former generals with illustrious military careers. Although the military was 
institutionalized to a certain level and was no more considered the personal asset of any 
individual, both Ataturk and Inonu were perceived as the honorary commanders, and 
therefore their authority, even as civilians, was never challenged by the military. With the 
advent of multi-party system and the affiliation of the CGS under the ministry of defense, 
however, CMR started to shift toward a relatively formal context.  
At a time when the TAF had directed all its efforts toward establishing formal 
foundations for civil–military relations; such as inclusive decision making processes, 
established procedures, and permanent bodies facilitating cooperation,  Adnan Menderes, 
the head of the ruling DP, was trying to emulate a relationship similar to the one between 
the TAF, and Ataturk and Inonu. As discussed earlier, both Ataturk and Inonu had 
illustrious military careers to capitalize on. In addition to that, they had another 
prominent commander, Fevzi Cakmak, ready to serve as the CGS with firm loyalty to his 
comrades in arms. Lacking both - that is an illustrious military past and a loyal partner, 
Adnan Menderes still insisted on sustaining the same practice, even without the consent 
of the officer corps. This persistent and conflicting stance by Menderes paved the way for 
the first coup in the modern Turkish history, which was followed by two interventions 
and another coup. With every coup and intervention, CMR in Turkey acquired a more 
formal and institutionalized identity through the establishment of bodies like the NSC and 
the laying of legitimate basis for the inclusion of the military in certain decision-making 
processes. On the other hand, the TAF became disproportionately autonomous through 
the exclusion or passivation of civilians in decision making processes related to “Senior 
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Personnel Decisions,” “Internal Security,” and “Intelligence Gathering.” The TAF’s 
intentions throughout this process were quite ambivalent: while trying to keep the politics 
and politicians out of the Professional Sphere, it simultaneously tried to secure its gains 
in the Political Sphere. 
At no time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic, did the TAF tried to 
dictate policy; instead, “it preferred to make recommendations.”183 Yet, all those 
recommendations were made “in the expectation that these would be applied, or at least 
not contradicted” by the civilian authorities.184 Both formal and informal “methods used 
to communicate these recommendations varied according to the policy area, the nature of 
the perceived threat, its importance or urgency, and the responsiveness of the civilian 
authorities.”185  
The most important and frequently used method, or institution, was and still is 
NSC, which is chaired by the president and comprises four representatives of the 
government (the prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of interior, and 
defense minister) and five members of the military (chief of general staff and 
commanders of the army, navy, air forces, and gendarmerie). The apparently equal 
composition of the NSC and the advisory feature of its decisions might make the NSC 
look like an ineffective body; yet the military, despite the numerical equality, has been 
able to dictate the issues to be discussed. Furthermore, “the article 118 of the 1982 
constitution upgraded the NSC, so that it was no longer a merely advisory body; now the 
Council of Ministers should give ‘priority consideration’ to its views.”186 This coupled 
with the qualitative superiority of the TAF, made NSC an important CMR tool at the 
disposal of the TAF. 
In addition to NSC, the TAF has been able to communicate with the civilian 
authorities “through participation in a number of other government bodies, such as 
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holding seats on the boards of Higher Education Council (HEC) … and the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTSC).”187 The TAF “also supplied one of the three judges 
on the panels responsible for hearing cases at the National Security Courts, which handed 
cases related to security.”188 Above all have been the high level weekly meetings 
between the chief of general staff and the prime minister. 
As mentioned above, there were also informal methods utilized within the context 
of CMR. These methods included “private meetings between leading generals and 
government ministers and officials, and public pronouncements.”189 
F. CMR METHODS (INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES) UTILIZED IN 
THE FIGHT AGAINST PKK  
All the afore-mentioned CMR methods (both institutions and practices) were 
already in place when the fight against PKK started in 1984 to the date of the first 
terrorist attack by the PKK. The TAF’s role in the fight against PKK has been nothing 
more than responding to the requests of the governors in accordance with the Provincial 
Administration Law (Il Idaresi Kanunu). Yet, in effect, the TAF has been the leading 
actor in the fight against PKK and at certain periods and places has practically 
administered the regions being threatened by the PKK. This, in addition to other issues 
that the TAF was intensely involved in, created a need for effective communication 
between the military and civilians. A variety of methods, depending on the policy area, 
the nature of the perceived threat, its importance or urgency, and the responsiveness of 
the civilian authorities, was utilized in this process. 
It was mentioned in previous sections of this paper that during the tenures of 
Ataturk and Inonu, the civilian leaders, thanks to their military background, were able to 
effectively run both the government and the TAF. Yet, with the advent of the multi-party 
system and the transfer of power from RPP to DP, a need for means to communicate 
occurred on both sides-the TAF and the government. As a result, Supreme Council of 





Defense, the forerunner of NSC, was founded in 1949 “to coordinate policy and facilitate 
communication between the armed forces and the government.”190 This body proved 
ineffective and Turkey experienced a coup in 1960. With the 1961 constitution, which 
was put in effect one year after the 1960 coup, the NSC was founded and its influence 
was further enhanced with the 1982 constitution, which was also drafted after a coup. 
Starting from the day it was founded, the NSC has been the most effective CMR 
institution in Turkey. Since “the PKK’s tactics sought to weaken Turkish authority 
through a combination of destroying state infrastructure and coercing the Kurdish public 
to support the PKK” and called for concerted political and military action, the NSC, as 
the only existing body to make that possible, have continued to remain the most effective 
CMR institution  in the fight against PKK. Although the 2003 amendments in the NSC 
and NSC General Secretariat Law-especially the requirement of the Secretary General of 
NSC to be a civilian and the appointment of the military personnel to positions within 
NSC through the consent of the Secretary General of NSC and CGS- seems to have made 
the TAF less influential in the council; the unmatched experience of the TAF, its strong 
institutional identity, and its intense involvement in the fight against PKK have 
minimized the effects of the amendments on its dominance. The transfer of intelligence 
duties to the National Intelligence Service (NIS/MIT), along with the personnel, 
equipment, and infrastructure, though, had a far more negative impact on TAF’s 
influence. 
The Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board and Under Secretariat of Public 
Order and Security, although founded to serve as a coordinating body for the “shaping of 
counter-terrorism policy and strategy and the coordination between the involved 
institutions,”191 soon evolved into a civil–military relations tool because of the 
predominance of TAF in the fight against PKK. Both bodies are currently affiliated under 
the Ministry of Interior. The under-secretariat, through an amendment of the related law 
in 2011, was directly put under the supervision of the Prime Minister and in 2014 was 
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affiliated back under the Ministry of Interior. The under-secretariat also functions as the 
secretariat of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board. The structures of both bodies 
are as shown in Figure 3.  
The distinguishing feature of these two bodies is their purpose of foundation, 
which is to oversee the fight against terrorism. These two bodies were, indeed, ad hoc 
institutions founded with the sole purpose fighting the PKK, yet both bodies have failed 
to yield the expected effectiveness. 
Along with the formal CMR methods mentioned above, there are also informal 
CMR methods; the most important and effective one being the weekly meetings between 
the Prime Minister and the CGS. Although the public knowledge about the meetings are 
confined to the limited press releases and the meetings happen in the format of the 
summoning of the CGS, it is obvious that important exchanges happen during these 
meetings between the Prime Minister (head of the civilians) and the CGS(head of the 
military). 
Among all the formal and informal methods, the NSC has proven to be the most 
effective and frequently utilized CMR institution so far. This is a natural outcome of the 





Figure 3.  Structures of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board and the 
Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security192 
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Gareth Jenkins argues that in cases where the government has been unable to 
provide the desired or expected performance in the face of serious problems, the Turkish 
public has turned to the military “either to intervene directly or to provide leadership in 
applying pressure to the government.”193 When faced with a terrorist threat feeding on 
“fissiparous nationalism”194 and targeting the integrity of the state, the Turkish public 
once again turned to the TAF. In response to this welcoming expectation and in accord 
with its traditional tendency of limiting its influence over politics with issues related to 
security, the TAF has been intensely involved in the fight against the PKK and thus has 
assumed the primary role in the fight against the PKK.  
In this chapter I will analyze the impacts of this role on the democratic civil–
military relations in Turkey (conceptualized by the democratic civilian control and 
effectiveness of the military). In the first section, I will present the existing situation with 
regards the democratic civilian control of the TAF by the time the PKK started its 
terrorist activities and then analyze the impacts of the TAF’s new role on the conditions 
shaping this situation. In the second section I will analyze the impacts of counter-
terrorism tasks on the effectiveness of the TAF and then assess the overall impact on the 
control–effectiveness balance within this context. 
A. THE IMPACTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK ON THE 
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
In sum, I argue that the impact of the fight against the PKK on the democratic 
civilian control of the TAF can best be observed through the changes in the informal 
authority of the TAF, rather than the formal, legislative changes. As such, the impact of 
the fight against PKK on the democratic civilian control follows Bilgic’s three categories. 
He categorizes the fight against PKK into three different approaches; (1) security oriented 
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approach, (2) semi-militaristic approach, and (3) multidimensional approach.195 Since the 
start of the fight against the PKK the Turkish state has adopted one of these approaches 
either as a response to the changes in the strategy used by the PKK or as a result of 
adjustment of its own strategy.  
During the period the first approach was adopted, which lasted until the early 
1990s, a security-oriented strategy, based on military-police-intelligence cooperation was 
utilized, in order to fight the armed terrorists.196 It is important to note at this point that 
the main focus was on the armed terrorists themselves-that is the fighting power of the 
PKK. Political, financial, and logistical activities of the PKK, on the other hand, were 
either neglected or left to the own initiative of related institutions, which had neither the 
capacity nor the will to assume a full-fledged struggle. As a result, the efforts during the 
time the first approach was adopted were limited to the imposing of emergency law and 
conducting of military operations in areas where the PKK was active. Although Bilgic 
states that the NIA and police forces were also used along with the military, the fact that 
the majority of the NIA personnel come from the military, and that only special 
operations units from the police forces were accepted to join the operations and that they 
were placed under the command of the military during those operations, indicates that the 
TAF was the primary actor during the time this approach was adopted. As Zuhal Ay 
Hamdan argues, “as the traditional guardian of Turkish security in broadest sense, the 
military played a dominant role both in the execution and shaping of policy” throughout 
this period.197 So, basically, the TAF’s role in the fight against the PKK in this period 
enhanced its autonomy, as well as its grip on the domestic politics, and thus adversely 
affected the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey. 
During the period the second approach was adopted, which lasted form early 
1990s until the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, “the focus shifted from fighting the 
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armed terrorists to taking preemptive actions against them,”198 which “specifically 
aim[ed] to prevent and/or reduce the future incidents of terrorist violence”199 and 
included “intelligence activities and terminating safe havens.”200 As also argued by 
Mustafa Unal Cosar, the main concern during this period was to bring terrorist attacks to 
a halt by simply “incapacitating the terrorist leadership.”201 Since the top level PKK 
leadership were in neighboring countries like Iraq and Syria, the influence of the TAF in 
the period the second approach was adopted extended beyond security related issues and 
the TAF started to influence the shaping of foreign policy through formal and informal 
mechanisms. The most effective and frequently used formal mechanism continued to be 
the NSC. As for informal methods and mechanism, military exercises along borders and 
press releases by high-ranking generals can be given as examples.202 The TAF’s role in 
the fight against the PKK in this period further enhanced its autonomy and extended its 
influence over issues other than security, such as foreign policy, and thus adversely 
affected the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey.  
During the periods the first two approaches were adopted the main concern was 
security, which made the TAF the primary actor making all the calls, and limited, even 
hindered, the inclusion of civilian institutions that was necessary for the extension of the 
fight into areas such as politics, finance, and logistics. As also argued by Hamdan, during 
the periods the first two approaches were adopted “the Turkish state successfully 
followed up the military dimension of the insurgency, but unfortunately failed to cope 
with its political implications.”  
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Realizing the failure of the first two approaches and in the face of recurrence of 
the terrorist acts of the PKK in 2005, as well as newly adopted political activities aimed 
at gaining support from both the Kurds and the international community,203 the Turkish 
state adopted a multidimensional approach, which called for the incorporation of “many 
civilian actors and institutions like the universities, media, business and finance, NGOs, 
and even the public,”204 and thus facilitated the extension of the fight against the PKK 
into formerly neglected areas. Within this context,  
in the early 2000s, the Turkish Government adopted and implemented 
socio-cultural, political, and criminological reforms. In addition, the 
Turkish Government has changed its rhetoric towards the Kurdish issue 
and has engaged in a transformation in its approach  since the early 2000s. 
Most importantly, Turkey has switched from a military rule of law to a 
civilian rule of law in its struggle against the PKK and its legal/illegal 
apparatus. In other words, the leading role of the military that had been 
granted since the inception of PKK violence was changed and the major 
responsibility in countering PKK violence and activities has been granted 
to law enforcement units.205 
Basically, in an effort to counter the changing strategy of the PKK (that is the adoption of 
political activities) and also learning from the experiences of the past; instead of a 
security based militaristic approach, in which the military was the leading actor making 
all the calls, the Turkish state adopted a multidimensional approach, in which the military 
was one of the primary actors acting in close coordination with civilian law enforcement 
units. The intense interaction caused by this close coordination created a cultural change 
within the TAF, yet it is not this cultural change itself which made de facto democratic 
civilian control possible; instead, it minimized the resistance against the EU 
harmonization process, for which civilian control of the TAF was one of the major issues.  
All in all, during the periods the first two approaches were adopted, the TAF acted 
as the leading actor, enhanced its informal authority, became disproportionately 
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autonomous, and thus consolidated its role as the guardian of the state. As a result of this 
enhanced authority and autonomy of the TAF, its influence over politics extended into 
areas such as foreign policy. The adverse effects of these two periods on democratic 
civilian control of the TAF, though, were minimized during the period a 
multidimensional approach was adopted. Although it was the EU harmonization process 
that made democratic civilian control of the TAF possible, the cultural change the TAF 
went through during the period the third approach was adopted acted as a facilitating 
factor. 
B. THE IMPACTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK ON TAF 
EFFECTIVENESS 
The effects of the fight against the PKK on the overall effectiveness of the TAF 
follow the concepts proposed by Brooks and Shemella.  
Brooks’ causal chain of military effectiveness, which is basically the translation 
process of the resources of a nation into a high level of integration, responsiveness, skill, 
and quality under the influence of independent variables, such as culture, social structure, 
political institutions, civil–military relations, interstate competition, global norms, 
international organizations and through the utilization of military activities. In the context 
of Turkey, being founded by a military genius, that is Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, after an 
all-out war against the major superpowers of the early 1900s that were trying to invade 
the homeland of the nation, the Turkish state and nation has always been aware of the 
need for an effective military. As a result of the aspiration to have a strong army and 
thanks to the military heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the TAF had already attained high 
levels of integration and responsiveness. The strict hierarchy and command and control 
structure, together with clearly defined threats and assets to counter those threats 
indicates that TAF’s objectives at tactical, operational, and strategic levels were already 
consistent. As for responsiveness, which is defined “as the ability to tailor military 
activity to a state’s own capabilities, its adversaries’ capabilities, and external 
constraints.”206 The TAF’s ability to adjust its force structure, which was designed under 
                                                 
206 Ibid., 11. 
 60 
the conditions of Cold War and the influence of NATO, in a way to fight against a 
terrorist organization using guerilla tactics indicates that the TAF had already attained a 
high level of responsiveness. So basically, the TAF had already attained high levels of 
integration and responsiveness by the time the fight against the PKK started.  
The real impact of the fight against the PKK, though, was on the skill and quality 
levels of the TAF. Brooks argues that skill “is reflected in small units’ ability to adapt to 
a constantly changing battlefield and to exploit opportunities,” and “is especially 
important in modern warfare, which is complicated by the assimilation of new 
technologies and weapon systems.”207 As for quality, she argues that it is a military’s 
“ability to provide itself with highly capable weapons and equipment.”208 Obviously skill 
and quality are closely related. I argue that the ability of the TAF to adapt to counter 
terrorism operations and its complex nature at small unit level increased the skill level of 
the TAF at both personnel level and institution level. As for quality, the most important 
indicator is the procurement of highly capable weapons systems and equipment. As 
shown in Figure 4, the ratio of military spending to GDP in Turkey has increased at times 
when the conflict has intensified.  
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Figure 4.   Military Expenditure (% of GDP)209 
All in all, the fight against the PKK has further enhanced the levels of integration 
and responsiveness, and has considerably increased the levels of skill, and quality of the 
TAF and thus has had a positive effect on the overall effectiveness of the TAF. 
As for the sustainment of effectiveness, Paul Shemella’s “roles and missions 
concept” provides a road map. As also mentioned in previous sections, Shemella argues 
that stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to the sustainment of effectiveness. 
It has been argued that the TAF has traditionally been perceived as the guardian of the 
state, which clearly assigns it a defender role as described by Shemella’s conceptual 
framework. This defender role is explicitly stated in Article 35 of the Turkish Armed 
Forces Internal Service Act. Although this defender role is limited to external threats, the 
Provincial Administration Law allows the utilization of the TAF against the internal 
threats at the request of city governors. So basically the Provincial Administration Law 
extends the defender role assigned to the TAF by the Turkish Armed Forces Internal 
Service Act and draws a legitimate context to use the military against internal threats. In 
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the light of this, I argue that the TAF’s involvement in the fight against the PKK is not a 
new role by itself, but rather an extension of the already assigned defender role, and thus 
perfectly conforms with idea of stability in the roles.  
As for missions; Shemella, argues that it is imperative to make a distinction 
between roles and missions, but at the same time establish a hierarchical link between 
them. Once accomplished, effectiveness can be more easily sustained if the missions are 
shaped in accordance with the roles they support. The TAF has been able to preserve the 
hierarchical link between its defender role and traditional missions while carrying out the 
non-tarditional missions assigned within the context of the fight against the PKK—that is 
“internal security functions, non-lethal force, low profile, small unit operations, 
permissive environment, lightly armed, local control, high civil–military interaction, 
diffuse command and control, and law enforcement mentality,”210 which indicates a 
felxibility in missions.  
Basically the TAF has been able to preserve and sustain its effectiveness in the 
fight against the PKK through stability in its legally assigned role of defender, and 
flexibility in traditional and non-traditional roles. 
Under these circumstances, one could argue that before 1999, when 
harmonization process of Turkish laws with the Copenhagen criteria started, upon the 
approval of Turkey’s bid for EU membership, civilian control component of the 
democratic civil–military relations in Turkey were characterized by high military 
autonomy and influence. In this context, Fotios Moustakis, in a rather forced 
interpretation,211 argues that the Turkish constitution, which assigns the TAF the task of 
making  
the timely and correct identification of threats to the unity of the country 
and the nation…and to protect the territory against internal threats which 
may necessitate the use of the Turkish armed force within the framework 
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of the Constitution and law against any overt or covert attempt to destroy 
the democratic parliamentary system…and the indivisible integrity of the 
Turkish nation, regardless of the source of the threat,212 
has provided the TAF with legitimate power to intervene and play an important role in 
domestic political processes related to security “whenever they feel necessary, or are 
ordered by the NSC.”213 So basically the 1981 constitution, which has been drafted after 
the 1980 military coup, has been the main source of legitimacy for such actions by the 
military. The fact that the 1981 constitution was not considerably changed until 1999, 
suggests that the fight against the PKK has had little impact on the democratization of 
civil–military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, Jenkins challenges this idea and argues 
that when the TAF attempts to influence political processes in Turkey it “depends on its 
informal authority, based on a combination of its historical role and its public prestige, 
rather than any officially defined legislative or executive powers.”214  
Nevertheless, the privileges granted to the TAF by the Constitution(s) and other 
legislation were taken away by legislative changes introduced within the context of EU 
harmonization process. Yet, since the TAF has historically depended on its informal 
authority—that is its historical role as the defender of the country and its public prestige 
feeding on this historical role, the changes in legislation were not expected to have a 
considerable impact on the democratic civilian control of the TAF. At the minimum, 
however, they seem to improve democratic civil–military relations, in that the civilians 
acquired more power over the armed forces. As such, legislative changes were welcomed 
and willingly adopted by the TAF. Although the legislative changes themselves were a 
result of the EU membership process, the willingness of the TAF to cooperate and adopt 
the changes, and hence, accept more input and influence by the civilians, is the result of 
the cultural change the TAF has been going through, which I argue is the by-product of 
the intense interaction with other government institutions within the context of the fight 
against the PKK. This cultural change is best observed in the words of the General Chief 
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of Staff Hilmi Ozkok himself; “We are respectful to the prevalent opinion of the public 
that the TAF should, even must, express its position regarding important issues by saying 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ and share it with the public yet the TAF should not be expected to take sides 
in all issues or share everything with the public.”215 So basically, by the time the country 
was getting ready to lay the foundations for democratization through harmonization laws 
and regulations, the TAF, which otherwise would have been in favor of sustaining the 
status quo and hinder the process, had already gone through a cultural change as a result 
of its involvement in the fight against the PKK.  
On the other hand, TAF’s involvement in the fight against PKK has positively 
affected the second component of democratic civil–military relations—the military 
effectiveness. Essentially, then, TAF’s taking on the fighting terrorism role (in parallel 
with NATO membership and prospect for EU integration) has had a modestly positive 
influence on democratic civil–military relations in Turkey. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis assessed the impacts of counter terrorism missions on the democratic 
civilian control and effectiveness of the TAF, as well the balance between civilian control 
and effectiveness. It found that civil–military relations in the modern Turkish Republic 
was nothing more than an absolute sub-ordinance to the civilians until 1949—thanks to 
the presidency of influential military figures like Ataturk and Inonu, and their strict 
control of the TAF through allegiant senior commanders like General Chief of Staff 
Fevzi Cakmak. Civil–military relations in this era were rather an extension of hierarchy 
beyond the military. With the foundation of the Supreme Council of Defense, though, 
civil–military relations in Turkey started to take a more formal context. Successfully 
capitalizing on its informal authority, the TAF gained dominance over the civilians 
within time, and by the time the fight against the PKK started, the TAF had gained a high 
level of autonomy within a state structure shaped by a constitution drafted after a military 
coup-that is the 1982 constitution. So basically, by the time the fight against the PKK 
started, the TAF not only had the upper hand against the civilian but literally controlled 
all political processes.  
The thesis also found that the abovementioned superiority of the TAF continued 
through the periods when security oriented and semi-militaristic approaches were 
adopted. It was still the TAF making all the calls and the civilians were simply 
responding to the requests made by the TAF through formal and informal mechanisms, 
most frequently through NSC resolutions. The main reason for the sustainment of the 
TAF’s superiority during these periods was the lack of competent civilian institutions 
included in the fight against the PKK. Basically, the TAF was the only actor rather than 
the primary actor during these periods, and this consolidated the TAF’s image in the eyes 
of the public, as well as its own perception of itself as the guardian of state. 
It also found that during the period the multidimensional approach was adopted 
many civilian actors and institutions like the universities, media, business and finance, 
NGOs, and even the public were incorporated in the fight against the PKK. Although it 
might be argued that the inclusion of the civilian themselves was the result of a change in 
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civil–military relations, the TAF still continued to dictate policies and occasionally 
control political processes. But the interaction and cultural exchange between the TAF 
and other civilian institutions partaking in the process created a considerable cultural 
change in the TAF and it was this cultural change that made it possible for the TAF to 
adapt to the reforms introduced through harmonization process. 
So basically, the TAF’s involvement in the fight against the PKK did not create a 
significant change in the civilian control of the TAF but it rather created a cultural change 
that made it possible for Turkey to make reforms that facilitated democratic civilian 
control over the TAF. As for effectiveness of the TAF, I argue that its role in the fight 
against the PKK helped TAF improve its skill and quality levels, and thus increased its 
effectiveness. Furthermore, the TAF, by accomplishing a stability in its roles (that is the 
defender role), and a flexibility in its missions (that is performing non-traditional roles 
along with traditional roles without significant changes in the force structure) the TAF 
was able to sustain the level of effectiveness it has attained.  
The control and effectiveness balance, on the other hand, was favorably affected 
by the TAF’s primary role in the fight against the PKK. The TAF, which was 
disproportionately autonomous and operated on a rigid force structure shaped by the 
conditions of cold war, attained a more flexible force structure so as to adapt the new 
non-traditional missions. This increase in effectiveness, though, did not adversely affect 
the democratic civilian control of the TAF; instead, the TAF became more content with 
civilian control, which was made possible by the cultural exchange with civilian 
institutions partaking in the process. 
Overall, the TAF’s involvement in the fight against the PKK increased the level 
of effectiveness of the TAF and created a cultural change that made it possible to 
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